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The Admissibility of Tape Recordings in Criminal
Trials Involving Domestic Disputes:
California's Proposition 8 and Title III of the
Federal Omnibus Crime Control
and Safe Streets Act
Lee Ashley Smith*
For truth itselfhas not the privilege to be spoken at all times and in
all sorts. I

I. INTRODUCTION: IS SOMEONE "BUGGING" YOU?
A father picks up an extension phone, concerned his son is having an
inappropriate relationship, and possibly being abused by an adult family
friend; the friend is later prosecuted. 2 A frightened girlfriend tape-records
* Ms. Smith is a J.D. candidate at University of California, Hastings College of the Law
(2004), and received a B.A. at University of California, Los Angeles (2001). She wishes to
thank the editorial staff at the Hastings Women's Law Journal for their hard work and
support. She also wishes to thank Los Angeles Deputy District Attorney Gregory Dohi for
his assistance, as well as the clerks who researched this project with her.
1. MICHEL EYQUEM, SEIGNEUR DE MONTAIGNE, Of Experience, in BOOK Itl, CHAP. XIII
(1588), availableat http://www.aber.ac.uk/-jmcwww/Montaigne/essay 107.html.
2. Facts based on a Massachusetts case in which a father feared that his fifteen-year-old
son was engaged in a sexual relationship with a fifty-seven-year old friend:
Tom's parents began to feel uneasy about their son's close relationship with
the defendant after the family's 1996 visit to Florida .... After the family
returned... [t]he parents noticed that when Tom spoke with the defendant
on the telephone, he would be unusually quiet, and sometimes even denied
afterwards that he had spoken to the defendant.
After discussing his concerns with his wife, Tom's father ordered a tape
recorder that he had seen advertised in a magazine in order to record secretly
telephone conversations at his house. Tom's father attached the machine to
the telephone line in his bedroom, and hid it under the bed. Neither Tom nor
his brother knew the tape recorder had been installed. Four telephone calls
between Tom and the defendant were recorded ....
In all of the
conversations, the defendant declared that he loved Tom, and in at least the
last three conversations, there are references to masturbation. Further, in the
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her boyfriend's late night threats over the telephone, and ends up dead after
marrying him. 3 An angry client comes to his attorney seeking the quickest
way to obtain proof of his wife's infidelity and wants to wiretap the family
phone. 4 While each of these scenarios might appear to have a "right" or
"wrong" feeling to you, each one is governed by different complexities of
state or federal law, either civil or criminal. These three scenarios
demonstrate the ease and proliferation of the availability of listening
devices.

Websites

"www.phonespy.com

' '6

such

as

"www.spousewatcher.com "'

5

and

offer the willing, non-governmental buyer a range
of listening devices. These devices range from the "parabolic shotgun7
microphone" for $59.95 to the prophylactic "Phone Line Tap Detector.,
Even Radio Shack offers telephone recorders that hook onto the handset of
a telephone, which begins recording the minute the phone picks up. 8 Most
second call ... the defendant mentions "making love."
Commonwealth v. Barboza, 763 N.E.2d 547, 550-552 (Mass. App. Ct. 2002), cert. denied,
Barboza v. Massachusetts, 537 U.S. 887 (2002).
3. Facts based on circumstances surrounding the murder of Bonnie Lee Bakley in May
of 2001 and the subsequent prosecution of Robert Blake:
"Baretta" star Robert Blake called his murdered wife Bonny Lee Bakley a
scheming liar and accused her of getting pregnant on purpose in a tape
recording played in court yesterday.
"You lied to me, you double-crossed me, you double-dealt me," said Blake,
who is accused of killing Bakley. "For the rest of your life you'll have to live
with that, and for the rest of my life, I'll never forget it"...
I only wanted
to be with you," she replied over and over.
The tape was the most dramatic piece of evidence that prosecutors unveiled
at the opening of a hearing to determine whether there is enough evidence to
bring Blake and bodyguard Earle Caldwell to trial in Bakley's murder.
Blake did not threaten Bakley on the tape - or even raise his voice. He said
he still cared about her. And he warned her that if she continues to pull
scams on other men, "it's going to come down on you." But he also insisted
that Bakley abort the child she was carrying .... All the drama, and all the
tears, and all the innocence, and all the sweetie pie... does not change the
truth," Blake told Bakley.
"You swore to me on your life that no matter what I didn't have to worry,
and that was a rotten, stinking, filthy lie and you deliberately got pregnant."
The 69-year-old actor, who played a sleuth in the 1970s TV crime series
"Baretta," married Bakley a short time later. Blake has denied killing
Bakley, 44, and says that one of the many men whom Bakley scammed out
of money might have murdered her.
Jim Grogan & Corky Siemaszko, Fightin' Words on Tape: Blake, Wife Battled In Secret
Recording Played At Hearing, DAILY NEWS (New York), February 27, 2003, at 9,
availableat LEXIS, News Library, Daily News File.
4. See Gary Skiloff, California Creates New Family Tort: Eavesdropping on the
Telephone, NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, October 28, 1985, at FAMILY LAW, 24 (providing a
discussion of this scenario).
5. At http.//www.spousewatcher.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
6. At http://www.phonespy.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
7. At http://www.spousewatcher.com (last visited Apr. 4, 2004).
8. Available
at
http://www.radioshack.com/category.asp?catalog%5Fname=CTLG&category/5Fname=CT
LG%5F008%5F008%5F012%5F001&Page= (last visited Apr. 4, 2004) (A recorder
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of these retailers disclaim their wares by telling potential buyers to "check
the laws in your area before using the two-way record feature [and that] it
is illegal in some states to record a conversation without the consent of all
parties to the conversation." 9 This Note will show however, that even with
the most sophisticated legal analysis, the courts, not to mention the
wayward consumer, have yet to determine exactly what is illegal and what
remedies are available for the wronged "tapee."
Familial and other domestic cases of eavesdropping and wiretapping
pose a special problem to sets of laws that were initially designed to govern
police misconduct or occasional political and business-related espionage.
For instance, using clandestine tape-recorded conversations as evidence
against an assailant in a domestic violence situation might seem more
justified than allowing recordings of an unfaithful spouse in a particularly
vindictive divorce proceeding. Parental control over the telephone habits
of minors could also pose privacy problems, yet still fits into Americans'
sense of outrage over sexual crimes against children and teens. In fact, in
recent decades, California has sanctioned the importance of "victim's
rights" in criminal proceedings. 10 Under Proposition 8, voters swept away
all independent state grounds for the exclusion of relevant evidence in
criminal trials. 1 However, under both California and federal law the act of
eavesdropping or wiretapping remains illegal,1 2 thus exposing family
members, domestic partners, or divorcees to criminal prosecution or civil
liability.
control device can be attached which turns the recorder on when the telephone receiver is
picked up).
9. At
http://www.radioshack.com/product.asp?catalog%5Fname=CTLG&category%5Fname=C
TLG%5FOO8%5FOO8%5FO12%5FOO1&product%5Fid=43%o2D2208
(last visited Apr. 4,
2004).
10. Proposition 8 was passed by voter initiative in 1982. See CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET 32
(June 8, 1982); initiative text available at http://holmes.uchastings.edulWelcome.html
[hereinafter
"Initiative
Text"],
and
argument
text
available
at
http://holmes.uchastings.edu/Welcome.html [hereinafter "Initiative Arguments"].
For
further background on the voter initiative see Aric Press, and Joe Contreras, A 'Victims' Bill
of Rights', NEWSWEEK (June 14, 1982), JUSTICE, at 64, availableat LEXIS, News Library,
Newsweek File.; The full text of the initiative as enacted is contained in CAL. CONST. art. I §
28 "Victims' Bill of Rights":
Right to Truth-in-Evidence. Except as provided by statute hereafter enacted
by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each house of the Legislature,
relevant evidence shall not be excluded in any criminal proceeding,
including pretrial and post conviction motions and hearings, or in any trial or
hearing of a juvenile for a criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or
adult court. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory rule of
evidence relating to privilege or hearsay, or Evidence Code, Sections 352,
782 or 1103. Nothing in this section shall affect any existing statutory or
constitutional right of the press.
CAL. CONST. art. I § 28 (d).
11. CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET 32, supra note 10.
12. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 632 (Deering 2003).
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This Note will first focus on the questions left open by California law
under Proposition 8 when dealing with such evidence in criminal trials.
Next, consideration will be given to the motivations behind Proposition 8
and its subsequent effects: whether it truly champions victims' rights,
whether it protects innocent defendants, and whether courts have heeded it
enough for it to be truly effective. Furthermore, this Note will contrast
relevant provisions of the Federal Omnibus Crime Control Act, since
federal courts have addressed the problems associated with domestic
wiretapping much more. Finally, the civil and criminal penalties available
for violation of these statutes will be discussed, accounting for the peculiar
complexities that accompany spousal, relationship, and inter-familial
recordings. In sum, has "truth in evidence" prevailed, and if so, is it doing
the work it should?
II. THE CALIFORNIA PROBLEM
A. THE STATUTES
California Penal Code Sections 631 and 632 [hereinafter Section 631
13
and Section 632] are parts of the California Electronic Privacy Act.
Section 631, entitled "Wiretapping," was passed in 1988 and reads in
relevant part:
(a) Any person who, by means of any machine, instrument, or
contrivance, or in any other manner, intentionally taps, or makes
any unauthorized connection, whether physically, electrically,
acoustically, inductively, or otherwise, with any telegraph or
telephone wire, line, cable, or instrument ...is punishable by a

fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars ($2,500) or
by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year, or
[both]...
(c) Except as proof in an action or prosecution for violation of this
section, no evidence obtained in violation of this section shall be
admissible in any judicial, administrative, legislative, or other
proceeding.
(d) This section shall become operative on January 1, 1994.14
13. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 631-632 (Deering 2003); See Flanagan v. Flanagan:

The California Invasion of Privacy Act (§ 630 et seq.) was enacted in 1967,
replacing prior laws that permitted the recording of telephone conversations
with the consent of one party to the conversation... The purpose of the act
was to protect the right of privacy by, among other things, requiring that all
parties consent to a recording of their conversation.
41 P.3d 575, 577 (Cal. 2002).
14. CAL. PEN. CODE § 631 (emphasis added).
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The California Court of Appeal has construed Section 631 to apply to
evidence obtained through wiretapping: "it is illegal for any person to tap
or make any unauthorized connection with any telephone line."'15 In People
v. Ratekin, the California Court of Appeal distinguished Section 631 as
applying to wiretapped calls only, while Section 632 prohibited
eavesdropping, "the interception of communications by the use of
equipment which is not connected to any transmission line."'16 Since law
enforcement officials and private investigators are generally the only
individuals who have the capability to tap into one's phone line directly,
activities of the general public do not usually fall into this category. Given
the advancements and availability of "listening" technology, however,
Section 631 may prove to be significant in future domestic cases.
Additionally, Section 631 provides the basis for exclusion of all illegally
'7
obtained evidence "in any judicial, legislative, or other proceeding.'
Prior to the passage of Proposition 8 in 1982, not only did this statute
proscribe certain conduct, but it also prohibited its availability as evidence.
Next, Section 632, entitled "Eavesdropping on or recording
confidential communications," was passed in 1976 and reads:
(a) Every person who, intentionally and without the consent of all
parties to a confidential communication, by means of any
electronic amplifying or recording device, eavesdrops upon or
records
the confidential
communication,
whether
the
communication is carried on among the parties in the presence of
one another or by means of a telegraph, telephone, or other
device.., shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand
five hundred dollars ($2,500) or by imprisonment in the county jail
not exceeding one year, or [both]...
(c)The term 'confidential communication' includes any

communication carried on in circumstances as may reasonably
indicate that any party to the communication desires it to be
confined to the parties thereto...
(d) Except as proof in an action or prosecution for violation of this
15. People v. Ratekin, 261 Cal.Rptr. 143, 145 (1989) (emphasis in original)
(distinguishing between Sections 631 and 632 in a case involving the use of a wiretap from
a government informant in a drug transaction with the defendant. Since the court concluded
Section 631 applied and it had not been amended by the state legislature, the wiretap
evidence was properly obtained and admissible under 18 U.S.C. § 2510 et. seq.).
16. Id. (emphasis added).
17. CAL. PEN. CODE §631.
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section, no evidence obtained as a result of eavesdropping upon or
recording a confidential communication in violation of this section
shall be admissible in any judicial, administrative, legislative, or
other proceeding."
Unlike Section 631, Section 632 can generally be violated by recording
one's phone conversation with a commercially available telephone hookup
that plugs into the line between the handset and the base station, therefore
lending itself more readily to domestic situations. 19 Indeed, the inclusion
of "confidential communications" clearly encompasses the private
recorder, and a government informer and his criminal confidante. Ratekin
also addresses this section: "[this statute] prohibits 'eavesdropping,' i.e.,
the interception of communications by the use of equipment which is not
connected to any transmission line., 20 And like Section 631, Section 632
proscribes the use of recordings as evidence "except as proof in an action
or prosecution for violation of this section., 21 Therefore, an individual has
valid state grounds under Section 632 to have tape recordings excluded
from evidence at a criminal trial.
In addition, it is also significant that Section 631 applies to "any
person" and Section 632 applies to "every person." Thus, it is not
important whether there is consent by one of the parties; the statute has
been violated. Situations in which one person is recording his conversation
with another are treated the same as those in which one party records two
other parties, presumably with a telephone extension, where neither of
them know they are "bugged." Finally, both sections are modified by
Section 633.5, which provides that:
Nothing in Section 631, 632... prohibits one party to a
confidential communication from recording the communication for
the purpose of obtaining evidence reasonablybelieved to relate the
commission by anotherparty to the communication of the crime of
extortion, kidnapping, bribery, any felony involving violence ...
[and nothing] renders any evidence so obtained inadmissible in
[such] prosecution.2 2
Thus, Section 633.5 allows one-party consent where a serious crime is
clearly contemplated. More prophylactic recordings would most likely fall
under Sections 631 and 632 as illegal. In contrast, the governing federal
§ 632 (emphasis added).
19. See Skiloff, supra note 4, at 24 (discussing the sale and use of such devices).
20. Ratekin, 261 Cal.Rptr. at 145 (emphasis added); accord Flanagan,41 P.3d. at 579
(The California Supreme Court held that a conversation is confidential under Section 632
"if a party to that conversation has an objectively reasonable expectation that the
conversation is not being overheard or recorded").
21. CAL. PEN. CODE § 632.
22. CAL. PEN. CODE § 633.5 (Deering 2003) (emphasis added).
18. CAL. PEN. CODE
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statutes are somewhat less restrictive in that a violation occurs only when
two-party consent is lacking; where one party consents or is doing the
recording, the activity is permissible.23 A "reasonable belief' that serious
crime will occur is not required.24
B. THE VOTE
In 1982, the voters of California approved Proposition 8, an initiative
known as the "Victim's Bill of Rights. 25 In the current political climate,
Californians were disillusioned by growing crime rates, restrictive state
exclusionary rules, and the reticence of the California judiciary to take the
victim's, as opposed to the defendant's, rights into account.26 In sum,
proponents viewed the initiative as a new balance between victim's and
defendant's rights. The initiative included the creation of restitution for
victims, allowing victim statements at sentencing and parole hearings,
placing a limit on plea bargains, and standardizing the bail process. 27 The
proposition was endorsed by hundreds of police chiefs, sheriffs, and district
attorneys, and supported by more than 30,000 "rank and file" police
23. 18 U.S.C. §2511 (2003).
24. See Title III of Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§
2510 et. seq. (2003).
25. See sources cited supra note; See Gary S. Goodpaster, An Essay on Ending the
Exclusionary Rule, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1065 (1982) (providing background on the enactment
of the initiative); John K. Van de Kamp & Richard W. Gerry, Reforming the Exclusionary
Rule: An Analysis of Two Proposed Amendments to the California Constitution, 33
HASTINGS L.J. 1109 (1982); John K. Van de Kamp & Richard W. Gerry, A Response to Paul
N. Halvonik, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 1151 (1982).
26. Initiative Arguments, CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET 32:

It is time for the people to take decisive action against violent crime. For too
long our courts and the professional politicians in Sacramento have
demonstrated more concern with the rights of criminals than with the rights
of innocent victims. This trend must be reversed. By voting "yes" on the
Victims' Bill of Rights you will restore balance to the rules governing the
use of evidence against criminals... limit the ability of violent criminals to
hide behind the insanity defense, and... give us a tool to stop extremely
dangerous offenders from being released on bail to commit more violent
crimes....
[H]igher courts of this state have created additional rights for the criminally
accused and placed more restrictions on law enforcement officers. This
proposition will overcome some of the adverse decisions by our higher
courts.

CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET 32, supra note 10; See Paul J. Pfmgst, Gregory Thompson, &
Kathleen M. Lewis, The Genie's Out of the Jar: The Development of Criminal Justice
Policy in California, 33 MCGEORGE L. REv. 717 (2002) (explaining how Proposition 8 is
one of a long pedigree of voter-driven initiatives that have responded to the plights of
victims and gotten tougher on criminals; also discusses Proposition 115, Three Strikes Law,
and California drug laws).
27. Initiative Arguments, CAL.

BALLOT PAMPHLET 32, supra note 10; see Grover C.

Trask, II & Timothy J. Searight, Proposition8 and the Exclusionary Rule: Towards a New
Balance of Defendant and Victim Rights, 23 PAC. L.J. 1101 (1992) (providing an analysis of
Proposition 8 in the context of other Supreme Court decisions regarding exclusionary rules,
and to what extent California has "federalized" its evidence law).
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officers.2 8
As part of this restorative balance, the initiative also sought to do away
with current limitations on the use of evidence in criminal proceedings.
Analysis by the Legislative Analyst stated:
Under current law, certain evidence is not permitted to be
presented in a criminal trial or hearing. For example, evidence
obtained through unlawful eavesdropping or wiretapping, or
through unlawful searches of persons or property, cannot be used
in court. This measure generally would allow most relevant
evidence to be presented in criminal cases, subject to exceptions as
the Legislature may in the future enact by a two-thirds vote. The
measure could not affect federal restrictions on the use of
evidence.29
Critics feared the repeal of exclusionary rules would allow "strip
searches of minor traffic offenders... [and would] condone the use of
wiretapping and seizure of your telephone and credit records without a
warrant., 30 Nevertheless, Proposition 8 passed 56.4% to 43.6% under the
battle cry: "There is absolutely no question that the passage of this
proposition will result in more criminal convictions, more criminals being
sentenced ' 3 to
state prison, and more protection for the law abiding
1
citizenry.
Thus, Article I, section 28, subdivision (d) of the California
Constitution now provides:
Right to Truth-in-Evidence.
Except as provided by statute
hereafter enacted by a two-thirds vote of the membership in each
house of the Legislature, relevant evidence shall not be excluded in
any criminal proceeding, including pretrial and post conviction
motions and hearings, or in any trial or hearing of a juvenile for a
criminal offense, whether heard in juvenile or adult court. 32
The constitutionality of the Amendment was upheld in 1982 in
Brosnahan v. Brown, 33 though the effects of its relevant provisions remain
unclear. 34 Did Proposition 8 also abrogate judge-made rules? What would
happen once a statute was amended - would the exclusionary rule also be
re-enacted?
How seriously would courts take the removal of these
exclusionary rules? Finally, how much and to what extent has the
28. Initiative Arguments, CAL. BALLOT PAMPHLET 32, supra note 10.
29. Id. (emphasis in original).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 28 (d).
33. 32 Cal. 3d 236 (1982).
34. See Trask & Searight, supra note 27, at 1109-10 (providing discussion and further
background).
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amendment truly championed victims' rights?
C. THE COURT

"Small phrases start large wars and simple sentences produce
generations of litigation. 3 5
Proposition 8 was tested in the courts almost immediately. In 1982 it
was given some protection in Brosnahan v. Brown, in which the California
Supreme Court stated, "[c]onsistent with our firmly established precedent,
we have jealously guarded this precious right [of initiative], giving the
initiative's terms a liberal construction." 36 However, in 1983, Proposition 8
passed muster by a bare four-to-three majority in Brosnahan, and in 1983 it
was held it could not be applied retroactively in People v. Smith.37 It was
not until 1985 that the California Supreme Court
fully came to grips with
38
the newly enacted amendment in In Re Lance W.
In re Lance W involved the admissibility of marijuana seized in an
unconstitutional search of a third person's car.39 The defendant argued that
California's "vicarious exclusionary rule" survived Proposition 8 and thus
rendered the evidence against him inadmissible.40 The four to three
decision, written by Justice Grodin, held that although the activity in
question was illegal - police officers' illegal entry of a vehicle - the
illicit nature of the evidence they gathered was nonetheless "relevant
evidence" admissible under Proposition 8.4 Under this analysis, the Court
held that Proposition 8 abrogated the judicial remedy of exclusion of
42
evidence obtained by unlawful search and seizure.
In addition, In re Lance W. considered whether, once a statute had been
amended, the exclusionary rule was also re-enacted.43 The court held that
"clean up" amendments 44 adopted by the Legislature as part of a bill
amending several sections of the Penal Code did not revive the
exclusionary rule pertaining to unlawful search and seizure: "We cannot
assume that the Legislature understood or intended that such far-reaching
consequences - virtually a legislative repeal of the 'Truth in Evidence'.

35. People v. Daan, 207 Cal. Rptr. 228, 233 (1984) (referring to the phrase "all relevant
evidence shall not be excluded" in section 28(d)).
36. Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d. at 262.
37. See Brosnahan, 32 Cal. 3d 236, See People v. Smith, 677 P. 2d 149, Trask &
Searight, supra note 27, at 1110.
38. 694 P.2d 744 (1985).
39. Id. at 747.
40. Id. at 748.
41. Id. at 752-53.
42. Id. at 752.
43. Id. at 756-57.
44. Id. at 757 ("The only mention [of the statute] in its summary of that measure by the
Senate Judiciary Committee was a reference to the amendment as a noncontroversial 'clean
up' amendment.").
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section of Proposition 8 - would follow an amendment so casually
proposed and adopted without opposition. '45 The court went on to cite to
Government Code Section 9605,46 which states that when a section or part
of a statute is amended, it is not repealed and then re-enacted in its
amended form, but those portions that are unaltered are to be considered as
having been the law from the time they were enacted.4 7 The court
concluded, "although [the governing statute] continues to provide the
exclusive procedure by which a defendant may seek suppression of
evidence.., a court may exclude the evidence on that basis only if the
exclusion is also mandated by the federal exclusionary48rule applicable to
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment.,
The lynchpin of the court's arguments in In re Lance W. rested on the
right of the people to determine state rules of evidence through the
legislative process, and that the intent underlying such legislation "is the
paramount consideration. '4 9 Thus, the court reasoned that "the express
intent of section 28(d) is to ensure that all relevant evidence be admitted.
That purpose cannot be effectuated if the judiciary is free to adopt
exclusionary rules that are not authorized by statute or mandated by the
Constitution., 50 The court recognized the validity and importance of using
ballot summaries and arguments in order to discern voter intent, though
abstained from substantive comment on the law itself, stating, "[W]hether
[the people] are wise in [their] decision is not for our determination; it is
45. In Re Lance W., 694 P.2d at 757.
46. CAL. Gov. CODE § 9605 provides:
Where a section or part of a statute is amended, it is not to be considered as
having been repealed and reenacted in the amended form. The portions
which are not altered are to be considered as having been the law from the
time when they were enacted; the new provisions are to be considered as
having been enacted at the time of the amendment; and the omitted portions
are to be considered as having been repealed at the time of the amendment.
When the same section or part of a statute is amended by two or more acts
enacted at the same session, any portion of an earlier one of such successive
acts which is omitted from a subsequent act shall be deemed to have been
omitted deliberately and any portion of a statute omitted by an earlier act
which is restored in the subsequent act shall be deemed to have been
restored deliberately.
In the absence of any express provision to the contrary in the statute
which is enacted last, it shall be conclusively presumed that the statute
which is enacted last is intended to prevail over statutes which are enacted
earlier at the same session and, in the absence of any express provision to the
contrary in the statute which has a higher chapter number, it shall be
presumed that a statute which has a higher chapter number was intended by
the Legislature to prevail over a statute which is enacted at the same session
but has a lower chapter number.
CAL. Gov. CODE § 9605 (Deering, 2003).
47. In Re. Lance W., 694 P.2d at 758.
48. Id. at 759.
49. Id. at 752-54.
50. Id. at 754.
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enough that they have made their intent clear.",5' Though, like the In re
Lance W court, subsequent judges have been skeptical, they have
nonetheless respected California voters' authority to create even ambiguous
laws. "While we may boggle at the devastation wrought to longstanding
evidentiary concepts and the exclusionary rule 'all relevant evidence shall
start
not be excluded' in Section 28(d), we are reminded that small phrases
52
litigation.,
of
generations
produce
sentences
simple
and
large wars
In the wiretap context, the California Court of Appeal held in 1989
that Proposition 8 trumped the exclusionary rule set forth by Section 631.5
The court of appeal further noted that in accord with Section 631, evidence
may be excluded only if required by the United States Constitution, or
where a "statute ... [has been] ... enacted by a two-thirds vote of the
membership in each house of the Legislature. 5 4 Under the reasoning of In
re Lance W, the re-enactment would need to be more than a "clean-up"
amendment to re-establish the exclusionary rule in Sections 631 or 632. 55
Since the passage of Proposition 8, Section 631 was amended once in
199256 and Section 632 has been amended four times, in 1977, 1990, 1992,
and 1994, with the addition of Sections 632.5, 632.6, and 632.7 in 1985,
1990, and 1992, respectively. 57 These additional sections regulate the
interception of conversations on cell phones or cordless phones.58 Other
51. In Re. Lance W., 694 P.2d at 752; See also Trask & Searight, supra note 27
(discussing the use of ballot summaries and arguments to discern voter intent).
52. People v. Daan, 207 Cal. Rptr. 228, 233 (1984) (applying In re Lance W. to Cal. Pen.
Code § 1538.5, finding that subsequent amendment did not create any new grounds for
exclusion).
53. See generally People v. Ratekin, 261 Cal. Rptr. 143 (1989).
54. Id. at 146 (citing In re Lance W., 694 P.2d at 755).
55. 694P.2dat757.
56. CAL. PEN. CODE§ 631:
1992 Amendment: In addition to making technical changes, substituted
"Section 632, 632.5, 632.6, 632.7" for "Section 632" in subd (a).
CAL. PEN. CODE § 631 (Deering 2003).
57. CAL. PEN. CODE § 632:
1985 Amendment: In addition to making technical changes, substituted
"Section 631, 632.5, or 636" for "Section 631 or 636" in the second sentence
of subd (a).
1990 Amendment: Amended subd (a) by substituting (1) "the" for "such"
after "carried on among" in the first sentence; and (2) "Section 631, 632.5,
632.6, or 636" for "Section 631, 632.5, or 636" in the second sentence.
1992 Amendment: (1) Added "632.7," in the second sentence of subd (a);
and (2) deleted "such" after "to the tariffs of" in subd (e).
1994 Amendment: Added "limited liability company," in subd (b).
CAL. PEN. CODE § 632 (Deering 2003).
58. CAL. PEN. CODE § 632.5, Interception of cellular radio telephone communications;
Punishment, provides:
(a) Every person who, maliciously and without the consent of all parties to
the communication, intercepts, receives, or assists in intercepting or
receiving a communication transmitted between cellular radio telephones or
between any cellular radio telephone and a landline telephone shall be
punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15:2

than the latter additions to Section 632, which clearly establish an
exclusionary rule in relation to specified devices, the other amendments
were technical and did not interfere with the rules of evidence regarding
eavesdropping or conversations that have been recorded.5 9 Thus, since
these amendments did not re-establish the exclusionary rules that were
abrogated by Proposition 8, illegally obtained tape recordings should
properly be introduced as evidence in criminal trials subject only to federal
exclusionary rules.
D. THE RESULTS

Although the above path from phone call to evidence seems fairly
navigable, it has been subjected to a wide range of criticism and judicial
skepticism. For instance, some say Proposition 8, the "Victims' Bill of
Rights," was used as a tool by prosecutors to introduce as much evidence
($2,500), by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one year or in the
state prison, or by both that fine and imprisonment. If the person has been
previously convicted of a violation of this section or Section 631, 632, 632.6,
632.7, or 636, the person shall be punished by a fine not exceeding ten
thousand dollars ($10,000), by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding
one year or in the state prison, or by both that fine and imprisonment.; (c) As
used in this section and Section 635, "cellular radio telephone" means a
wireless telephone authorized by the Federal Communications Commission
to operate in the frequency bandwidth reserved for cellular radio telephones.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 632.5 (Deering, 2003);
CAL. PEN. CODE § 632.7, Eavesdropping on and recording of communications transmitted
between cellularor cordless telephones; Punishment,provides:
(a) Every person who, without the consent of all parties to a
communication, intercepts or receives and intentionally records, or assists in
the interception or reception and intentional recordation of, a communication
transmitted between two cellular radio telephones, a cellular radio telephone
and a landline telephone, two cordless telephones, a cordless telephone and a
landline telephone, or a cordless telephone and a cellular radio telephone,
shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand five hundred dollars
($2,500), or by imprisonment in a county jail not exceeding one year, or in
the state prison, or by both that fine and imprisonment. If the person has
been convicted previously of a violation of this section or of Section 631,
632, 632.5, 632.6, or 636, the person shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding ten thousand dollars ($10,000), by imprisonment in a county jail
not exceeding one year, or in the state prison, or by both that fine and
imprisonment.; (c) As used in this section, each of the following terms have
the following meaning: (1) "Cellular radio telephone" means a wireless
telephone authorized by the Federal Communications Commission to
operate in the frequency bandwidth reserved for cellular radio telephones.
(2) "Cordless telephone" means a two-way, low power communication
system consisting of two parts, a "base" unit which connects to the public
switched telephone network and a handset or "remote" unit, that are
connected by a radio link and authorized by the Federal Communications
Commission to operate in the frequency bandwidths reserved for cordless
telephones. (3) "Communication" includes, but is not limited to,
communications transmitted by voice, data, or image, including facsimile.
CAL. PEN. CODE § 632.7 (Deering 2003).
59. CAL. PEN. CODE § 632; CAL. PEN. CODE § 632.5.
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as possible, and has little to do with victims' concerns - such as helping
them recover. 60 To this end, the nexus between state, prosecutorial, and
victim interests has been questioned, especially in domestic violence cases:
"the complexities of requiring prosecutors to honor victim's rights while
representing important state interests are well-illustrated by the clash of
values and interests in relationship violence cases. 61 While some have
worked to maintain that domestic or relationship violence is serious, and
want to treat it the same as other assaults and rapes, others argue that
individual victims may not want their assailants to be prosecuted - they
may simply want to end the violence.62 From the prosecutor's perspective,
mandatory prosecution laws "punish the batterer in order to protect
potential victims via deterrence and, presumably, incapacitation," but do
not put the current victims at the center.63 Critics of "victim's rights in
sheep's clothing" suggest either independent representation for the victim,
or "dignity without amendments," to create a sensitive and smooth-running
judicial process. 64
Proposition 8 has also been criticized in for its practicality. Deciding
when, where, and how each statute is to be interpreted after Proposition 8 is
said to leave courts to revert back to what is known, repeal evidentiary
rules, and virtually ignore the allowance of evidence that can be properly
admitted.6 5 Critics have suggested that, if the intent of the provision was to
federalize the exclusionary rule and expand the admissibility of relevant
evidence in criminal cases, it has met much resistance in California
courts. 66 For instance, in 1987 the California Supreme Court held that the
initiative had no application in situations involving Miranda violations
which would continue to be governed by California law.67 Although the
court reversed itself in 1988, there are "major unresolved areas" involving
the federalization of the exclusionary rule where the California Supreme
Court has not ruled, such as whether evidence obtained in violation of the
defendant's right to counsel is admissible. 68 Nonetheless, the judiciary and
practitioners alike are criticized; judges for applying repealed evidentiary
rules and prosecutors for not being strong enough advocates: "practitioners
can claim that they were waiting for clear guidance from the courts before
60. See Lynn H. Henderson, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, 37 STAN. L. REv. 937
(1985); Lynn H. Henderson, Revisiting Victim's Rights, 1999 UTAH L. REv. 383 (1999); See
also Gary F. Uelman, Victim's Rights in California,8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT 197
(1992).
61. Henderson, Revisiting Victim's Rights, supra note 60, at 424.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 426.
64. Id. at 429-34.
65. See Hank M. Goldberg, Proposition 8: A Prosecutor'sPerspective, 23 PAC. L.J. 947
(1992) (examining the effectiveness of Proposition 8 ten years after its enactment).
66. Id. at 960-61.
67. Id. at 962-63.
68. Id. at 963.
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advancing evidentiary arguments based on Proposition 8. But, it may have
been the courts which were waiting 69for the practitioners to advance the
arguments before they decided them.,
Aside from this legal game of hot potato, the judiciary has also
substantively quarreled with the idea that decades of carefully crafted
bench-made exclusionary rules were set adrift.70 Judicial concern has not
been with the asserted victim's rights, but the wisdom of impinging on the
individual defendant's rights instead. Justice Mosk observed:
In Asia, Latin America, and other areas of this troubled world
courageous men are striving, and some are dying, to establish and
expand individual rights. It is ironic that in California our existing
individual rights are being curtailed ...the blame for this sorry
situation in which we find ourselves must be squarely placed on
Proposition 8. That ill-conceived measure has struck down
California precedents on individual
rights as it has encountered
7
them in its path of destruction. 1
Courts have also recognized their limitations in passing judgment on
voter intent; the majority began In re Lance W. by admitting "[t]he
members of this court have diverse views regarding the importance and
proper scope as it has developed over the years... however, we are
obliged to set aside our personal philosophies and to give effect to the
expression of popular will. '72 Finally, as recently as 2003, the U.S.
Supreme Court voted to uphold California's controversial Three Strikes
Law, stating "though [such] laws may be relatively new, our tradition of
deferring to state legislatures in making and implementing such important
policy decisions is longstanding"7 3 and "we do not sit as a

69. Goldberg, supra note 65, at 970.
70. People v. Daan, 207 Cal. Rptr. 228,233 (1984).
71. People v. Markham, 775 P.2d 1042, 1047-48 (Cal. 1989) (Mosk, concurring)
(emphasis omitted).
72. 694 P.2d at 747.
73. Ewing v. California:
Throughout the States, legislatures enacting three strikes laws made a
deliberate policy choice that individuals who have repeatedly engaged in
serious or violent criminal behavior, and whose conduct has not been
deterred by more conventional approaches to punishment, must be isolated
from society in order to protect the public safety. Though three strikes laws
may be relatively new, our tradition or deferring to state legislatures in
making and implementing such important policy decisions is longstanding
[citations omitted] ...Our traditional deference to legislative policy choices
finds a corollary in the principle that the Constitution "does not mandate
adoption of any one penalogical theory" [citations omitted] ...Selecting the
sentencing rationales is generally a policy choice to be made by state
legislatures, not federal courts.
538 U.S. 11, 24-25 (2003).
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'superlegislature' to second-guess these policy choices. 74
The Supreme Court's recent decision thus encapsulates a response to
all of the above criticisms: voter intent is of paramount importance in
enacting and maintaining California legislation. In a perfect world,
practitioners and judges would follow suit, and their efforts would redress
the harm done to victims. Although victims may have different goals in
mind - especially those involved in domestic or relationship violence the admission of certain evidence, such as taped recordings, is reliable and
relevant enough to justify it as admissible evidence under Proposition 8.
However, federal courts have been much more vocal on the nexus
between relationship and domestic violence and the specific use of taped
recordings in criminal and civil proceedings, and we now turn toward that
body of statutory and case law.
III. THE FEDERAL SOLUTION
A. ONE-PARTY CONSENT: THE OMNIBUS CRIME CONTROL AND SAFE

STREET ACT
Federal regulation of wiretaps and electronic interception of
communications came only after a long history of court and publicsanctioned use of private and governmental wiretaps of telephones.75 It
was not until 1967 that the U.S. Supreme Court held in Katz v. United
States that attaching a recording device to the outside of a glass-paneled
telephone booth constituted a Fourth Amendment "search and seizure"
under a two-fold requirement that 1) the communicant have a subjective
expectation of privacy, and 2) that expectation be one that society is
prepared to recognize as "reasonable. 76
In passing Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street Act
of 196877 [hereinafter "Title III"] Congress responded to Katz,78 making it
unlawful for any person to intercept any wire, oral, or electronic
communication "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically" permitted by other
provisions of the statute. 79 Title III, however, has a number of exceptions,
74. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28.
75. See Carol M. Bast, What's Bugging You? Inconsistencies and Irrationalitiesof the
Law of Eavesdropping,47 DEPAUL L. REv. 837, 842 (1998) (Discussing Katz and Title III);
See also Olmstead v. U.S., 277 U.S. 438 (1928),

overruled by Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347

(1967).
76. See generally Katz, 389 U.S. 347.
77. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (2003).
78. Bast, supra note 75, at 842.
79. 18 U.S.C. §2511, Interception and disclosure of wire, oral, or electronic
communicationsprohibited,subd. (1)(a):
(1) Except as otherwise specifically provided in this chapter [18 USCS §§
2510 et seq.] any person who
(a) intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic
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which are listed in 18 United States Code, Section 2511, subdivision (2).
That section provides that it shall not be unlawful for a person to intercept a
communication where "such person is a party to the communication or
where one of the parties to the communication has given prior consent to
such interception unless such communication is intercepted for the purpose
of committing any criminal or tortuous act [under state or federal law]."8 °
Under Section 2511, criminal penalties carry a maximum five years
imprisonment, 81 and Section 2520 authorizes additional civil damages for
interception, disclosure, or prohibited uses of a wiretap communication.
In addition, Title III preempts state wiretapping and eavesdropping statutes;
state statutes
must provide at least as much protection, and can provide
83
even more.

B. INTERPRETING ONE-PARTY CONSENT
In garden-variety eavesdropping or wiretapping cases, judicial
decisions have been fairly straightforward; where two-party consent is
lacking, the recording was taken in violation of Title III and is inadmissible
in court. In a California case, People v. Otto,84 the victim, Joe Otto,
communication... shall be punished as provided in subsection (4) or shall
be subject to suit as provided in subsection (5).
18 U.S.C. §2511 (1)(a).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(d) (emphasis added):
(d) It shall not be unlawful under this chapter [18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.]
for a person not acting under color of law to intercept a wire, oral, or
electronic communication where such person is a party to the
communication or where one of the parties to the communication has given
prior consent to such interception unless such communication is intercepted
for the purpose of committing any criminal or tortious act in violation of the
Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State (emphasis added).
18 U.S.C. § 251 1(2)(d).
81. 18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a):
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this subsection or in subsection
(5), whoever violates subsection (1) of this section shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
18 U.S.C. § 2511(4)(a).
82. 18 U.S.C. § 2520. Recovery of civil damages authorized:
(a) In general. Except as provided in section 2511(2)(a)(ii), any person
whose wire, oral, or electronic communication is intercepted, disclosed, or
intentionally used in violation of this chapter [18 USCS §§ 2510 et seq.] may
in a civil action recover from the person or entity, other than the United
States, which engaged in that violation such relief as may be appropriate.
(b) Relief. In an action under this section, appropriate relief includes(1) such preliminary and other equitable or declaratory relief as may be
appropriate;
(2) damages under subsection (c) and punitive damages in appropriate
cases;
and
(3) a reasonable attorney's fee and other litigation costs reasonably
incurred.
18 U.S.C. § 2520.
83. See Bast, supra note 75, at 845.
84. People v. Otto, 831 P.2d 1178, 1180 (Cal. 1992).
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recorded his wife Brenda Sue's phone calls even before they were
married. 85 After she discovered and unplugged the device, Joe continued to
tape Brenda Sue's calls using a voice-activated recorder under her
daughter's bed. 86 The recorder eventually taped a conversation between
Brenda Sue and her lover, planning Joe's murder; forty-eight hours later,
Joe was found bludgeoned to death in his own home.8 7 In a subsequent
murder prosecution, the tapes of these conversations were the "linchpin
[sic] of the state's case." 88 Nonetheless, the California Supreme Court held
that the tapes were taken in violation of Title III because neither party had
consented
to the taping, and their admission into evidence was reversible
89
error.

Despite this clear-cut, yet disturbing ruling, controversy has arisen as to
whether an "interspousal exception" to Title III exists, meaning recordings
between married partners fall outside federal regulation. 90 A split in the
courts began with the 1974 Fifth Circuit decision in Simpson v. Simpson
where the court refused to apply Title III to "marital home and domestic
conflicts" though "[t]he naked language of Title III, by virtue of its
inclusiveness, reache[d] the case." 91 The vast majority of courts have
declined to follow Simpson, instead holding that the, "clear and
unambiguous language of Title III prohibits all wiretaps except those
specifically enumerated," a list which does not include interspousal
wiretapping. 92 Thus, one-party consent should still apply to marital or
domestic partners under Section 2511(2)(d) where one of the partners is the
doing the recording.
Another domestic realm where Title III has potential application in is
the child-parent relationship. In a recent Massachusetts Court of Appeals
decision on which the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari,9 3 recordings
made by the parents of a teenager could be used as evidence against the
defendant, who was charged with rape, indecent assault, and battery on
their son.94 The court considered the defendant's claims under the federal
wiretap statute in addition to the Massachusetts exclusionary rule.95 The
Massachusetts court agreed with other district court holdings that one-party
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 1180-82.
88. Id. at 1196.
89. Id.
90. See David J. Anderman, Comment. Title III at a Crossroads: The OrdinaryCourse of
Business in the Home, The Consent of Children, and Parental Wiretapping, 141 U. PA. L.
REv. 2261, 2262 (1993) (discussing some courts' refusal to apply Title III in both
interspousal and parental wiretapping cases).
91. Id. at 2263-64.
92. Id. at 2265.
93. Barboza, 763 N.E.2d at 549-52.
94. Id.
95. Barboza, 763 N.E.2d at 553.
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consent is satisfied in these circumstances, "with consent coming from the
parent vicariously on behalf of his or her minor child,, 96 where "the taping
was motivated by a genuine concern for the child's well-being." 97 Indeed,
parental consent and the "extension telephone exception" have been used
by federal courts to "permit family members within their own homes to
eavesdrop on, and even record, each other." 98 Critics have also noted the
reluctance of federal courts to apply Title III to "an area 99
normally left
private and open to parental discretion, namely, childrearing."
Although the Massachusetts wiretap statute, like California's, required
two-party consent, it also called on the trial court to decide whether
unlawfully intercepted communications should be suppressed. 00 The
Massachusetts court rested its decision on the fact that exclusionary rules
are usually meant to deter future police misconduct.10° Here, the court saw
"no reason why the rule should protect the defendant... from the
consequences of the unlawful interception by a private citizen."' 0 2 Indeed,
the court's decision appears to have been influenced by the facts of the
case; "a father, acting in the privacy of his own home, without any
government involvement, [sought] to protect his child from sexual
exploitation by the defendant."' 0 3 Though civil redress is ostensibly
available, the court correctly concluded that the state and federal
governments' interests in deterrence would not be served by suppressing
this exceedingly reliable evidence.
C.

CIVIL AND CRIMINAL RELIEF UNDER TITLE III AND CALIFORNIA STATE

LAW

Both Title III and the California wiretap statutes provide for
prosecution and hefty fines for an illegal wiretap.1 4 Since the exclusionary
remedy is not always available for such illegal activity, the judiciousness
and importance of these remaining remedies will be evaluated. One critic
has noted:
There's no telling what would happen if a child brought suit on
these grounds. Or whether a parent could be convicted for taping a
minor child's calls ....

Perhaps the family's right to privacy would

prevail, but that shouldn't be a matter of uncertainty.

Lest

adolescents find out ... and start telling their parents 'I've got a

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Id., citing Pollock v. Pollock, 154 F.3d 601, 610 (6th Cir. 1998).
Id.
Id. at 554.
Anderman, supra note 90, at 2266.
Barboza, 763 N.E.2d at 551.

101. Id. at 552
102. Id.
103. Id. at 552-53.
104. See 18 U.S.C. § 2520; CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 631-632.

Summer 20041

TAPE RECORDINGS IN DOMESTIC DISPUTES

05
right...' the legislature should clarify who owns the telephones.

Indeed, the relationship between a parent and child or even two spouses
would certainly belie any criminal or civil penalties, and might make the
illegalities of the aforementioned statutes empty promises with no real teeth
at all. Additionally, the fact that a defendant in a murder trial has illegally
obtained recordings used against him in addition to the lack of any criminal
or civil redress might seem doubly unfair.
The response to these queries is first, since the statutes' substantive
provisions apply so seldom outside governmental, political, or business
settings, their remedies are meant to be most effective in those contexts as
well.1 6 Indeed, it was Congress' intent to beef up these other remedies in
instances where the exclusionary rule does not apply. 0 7 Facing a potential
felony conviction for a single act, or even sanctions for an attorney who
suborns illegal recordings, may nonetheless be enough of a deterrent to
bad-faith actors.
IV. CONCLUSION
To return to basic evidence law, admissible evidence must be relevant,
reliable, and not unfairly prejudicial.10 8 In conjunction with criminal
procedure, some evidence is seen as coming from such an unwanted source
that courts and legislatures have seen fit to exclude it from criminal
proceedings completely.
Under federal law, Title III was meant to protect an individual or
corporate entity's privacy, as well as curb police misconduct. In enacting
Title III, Congress was also concerned about wayward spouses and their
105. Parents,Hide Those Phones. The Issue: Court Upholds a Law Banning Interference
with Phone Calls. Our view: That's Fine in Emergencies, but Not Always for Other Uses,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 2, 1999, at 55A, available at LEXIS, News Library, Rocky

Mountain News File (discussing Colorado Supreme Court's decision to uphold a state law
making it illegal to stop someone from calling 911 in an emergency under state wiretapping
laws).
106. See Scott J. Glick, Article: Is Your Spouse Taping Your Telephone Calls?: Title III
and Interspousal Electronic Surveillance, 41 CATH. U. L. REv. 845, 856-63 (1992)
(providing a discussion of the legislative history of Title III).
107. Id.
108. Fed. R. Evid. 401:
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.
Fed. R. Edid. 401. Definition of "Relevant Evidence."
Fed. R. Evid. 403:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
Fed. R. Evid. 403. Exclusion of Relevant Evidence on Grounds of Prejudice, Confusion, or
Waste of Time.
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use of electronic eavesdropping for domestic disputes, namely divorce.
Thus, Title III set a minimum standard of one-party consent for the
1 0
admissibility of "wiretap" or "eavesdrop" evidence in criminal trials."
This standard is flexible enough to permit "parental wiretaps" yet does not
allow purely clandestine recording of another's activities - including a
spouse or domestic partner. In short, privacy rights are protected to the
extent one can expect to exert his or her more general individual rights,
such as in the case of a minor.
Under California Penal Code sections 631 and 632, the state of
California set its bar a bit higher. Both parties must consent to the
recording for wiretap or eavesdrop evidence to come in."1 Responding to
increased crime and leniency granted to violent offenders, however,
California voters took this evidence back and began using it in criminal
trials. California now follows Title III as its standard for exclusion. Not
surprisingly, after all of the legal gymnastics - statutes, initiatives, years
of court litigation - the basic rules of evidence compel the same
conclusions. Under relevance, the Barboza, Blake-Bakley, and even
divorce recordings mentioned in the introduction to this Note all pass
muster. Similarly, if all are properly authenticated, they are sufficiently
reliable as evidence. However, one could argue that a conversation
between a wife and lover, presented in a civil divorce proceeding, is
unfairly prejudicial to the issues at hand. Instead, public policy should
compel the use of conversations between a defendant (husband or lover)
and a victim as evidence in court.
Nonetheless, the evidentiary debate is meaningless unless the issue of
victims' rights is addressed. As aforementioned, one critic suggests either
calling the evidentiary rule what it is - a prosecutor's tool - or else
abandoning misguided "amendments" in favor of a sensitive judicial
process.1 2 Indeed, it has been suggested that by misbranding initiatives
like Proposition 8, or Proposition 115, the 1991 "Crime Victims Justice
Reform Act," these measures still remain "inadequate to serve crime

control interests or mollify victims.

' 113

It appears that the legislature and

voters have attempted to dovetail not only past, but future victims'
concerns with evidentiary rules in a way that ensures those victims retain
sufficient legal recourse against their assailants. Instead of perfecting the
process, which would be far from easy, the initiative has struck a
compromise by improving the process to the extent that known attackers do
109. See Glick, supra note 106, at 857 (noting that Congress initiated legislation banning
electronic surveillance by police and individuals after holding hearings regarding the use of
such surveillance devices in domestic relations cases).
110. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et. seq.
111. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 631-632.
112. See generally, The Wrongs of Victim's Rights, supra note 60; Revisiting Victim's
Rights, supranote 60.
113. Revisiting Victim's Rights, supra note 60, at 383-84.
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not walk free. Indeed, as Californians sought to enact the Three Strikes
Law, which meant more certainty in prison terms for violent felons, the
kidnap and murder of twelve year-old Polly Klaas galvanized the state into
Thus,
an overwhelming support for the controversial initiative. 14
supporters were not only concerned about those victims whose lives had
already been taken or affected, but also the potential for future deterrence
and incapacitation. This may not always be what the victim of domestic
violence wants - sometimes "just making it stop" is enough - but for the
sake of future victims and for those victims who have paid the ultimate
price, using any shred of evidence that gets to the truth is surely
worthwhile.

114. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 15.
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